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Abstract
Standard economic models of tort deterrence assume that a tortfeasors pre-
caution set is convex usually the non-negative real numbers, interpreted as the
set of feasible levels of spending on safety. In reality, however, the precaution
set is often discrete. A good example is the problem of complex product design
(e.g., the Boeing 737 MAX airplane), where the problem is less about how much
one spends on safety and more about which combination of safety measures one
selects from a large but discrete set of alternatives. I show that in cases where
the precaution set is discrete, the problem faced by a tortfeasor under strict
liability and negligence is computationally intractable, frustrating their static
deterrence e¤ects. I then argue that negligence has a dynamic advantage over
strict liability in that negligence can move a tortfeasors behavior in the direc-
tion of socially optimal care over time more rapidly than strict liability.
JEL codes: C61, K13.
Keywords: computational complexity, NP-hard, negligence, strict liability,
supermodularity, tort law.
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1 Introduction
In many ways the economic approach to law embraces Oliver Wendell Holmes"bad
man" theory of the law (Holmes 1897). Holmes argued that if "you want to know
the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man," to whom the notion of
legal duty means "a prophecy that if he does certain things he will be subjected to
disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory payment of money"
(Holmes 1897, pp. 459 & 461). In other words, if you want to understand the law,
you must focus on the deterrence e¤ects of legal rules.
Nowhere is the focus on the deterrence e¤ects of legal rules more prominent than
in the economic analysis of tort law. The economic model of tort deterrence posits
that the tortfeasor, known as the injurer, chooses safety precautions, or care, when
engaging in a risky activity to minimize his expected liability plus his cost of care
(see, e.g., Shavell 1987, ch. 2). Under the economic model, a liability rule is optimal
if the solution to the injurers care-taking problem under that rule is socially optimal.
Standard formulations of the economic model of tort deterrence constitute the
injurer as the unboundedly rational bad man. Unbounded rationality implies that
the injurer can compute the solution to his care-taking problem. This in turn implies
than an optimal liability rule can achieve socially optimal deterrence, for it can induce
the injurer to take socially optimal care (see, e.g., Cooter and Ulen 2012, ch. 7).
Beginning with Simon (1955, 1957), economists have questioned the assumption of
unbounded rationality and explored the implications of bounded rationality for stan-
dard economic analysis. Legal economists have followed suit (see, e.g., Jolls, Sunstein,
and Thaler 1998; Korobkin and Ulen 2000). An important aspect of bounded ratio-
nality is limited computational capacity. This aspect of bounded rationality refers
not only to humans limited cognitive ability or skill with respect to computation,
but also to the theoretical and practical limits of computability even when aided by
machines (see, e.g., Simon 1976, 1990). While the former limit is the subject of be-
havioral economics and psychology, the latter limits are the subjects of computability
theory and computational complexity theory, respectively.
In this paper, I examine the computational complexity of the injurers care-taking
problem under strict liability and negligence, the two basic liability rules of Anglo-
American tort law, and explore the implications thereof for the deterrence e¤ects of
these rules. I start by dening several concepts from computational complexity theory,
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including what it means for a problem to be computationally tractable. Informally,
a problem is computationally tractable if it can be solved in a reasonable amount of
time even as the scale of the problem becomes large.
In the heart of the paper, I analyze the static deterrence e¤ects of strict liability
and negligence using the unilateral care model with xed activity level.1 I probe the
standard assumption that the injurers precaution set is convex usually the non-
negative real numbers, interpreted as the set of feasible levels of spending on safety. In
reality, the precaution set is often discrete. A good example is the problem of complex
product design (e.g., the Boeing 737 MAX airplane), where the problem is less about
how much one spends on safety and more about which combination of safety measures
one selects from a large but discrete set of alternatives.2 Nevertheless, the assumption
of "convex care" seems innocuous enough. "All models are approximations," after
all; their assumptions "are never exactly true" (Box, Luceño, and Paniagua-Quiñones
2009, p. 61). At the same time, however, because "all models are wrong the scientist
must be alert to what is importantly wrong" (Box 1976, p. 792). I show that (i) the
assumption of convex care is instrumental to ensuring that the injurers care-taking
problem under strict liability and negligence is computationally tractable, and that
(ii) if the precaution set is discrete and large, the injurers care-taking problem is
computationally intractable. In other words, I show that the convex care assumption
underwrites the unbounded rationality assumption, and that relaxing this assumption
frustrates the static deterrence e¤ects of strict liability and negligence.
The basic intuition behind these results is the following. Under the standard,
convex care version of the model, the injurers care-taking problem is a convex op-
timization problem the minimization of a convex function over a convex set. By
contrast, the discrete analog of the injurers problem entails the minimization of a
supermodular set function over a discrete set. There are known methods for solving
convex optimization problems in a reasonable amount of time even when the feasible
set is large. This is not the case for the problem of minimizing a supermodular set
function over a discrete set. The only known method for solving this problem is the
1The unilateral care model with xed activity level is the foundational model upon which other
economic models of tort deterrence are built. In cases of unilateral care, the injurer, but not the
victim, can take care to reduce the expected loss to the victim from the injurers activity. In cases
of unilateral care with xed activity level, the injurer can reduce the expected loss only by taking
care and not by modulating his activity level.
2Other examples include many important medical care investments; see Arlen (2010, p. 993 n. 97).
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brute-force method i.e., evaluating the function at every subset of the feasible set
which takes an unreasonable amount of time when the feasible set is large because
the number of subsets grows exponentially with the size of the feasible set.
Lastly, I consider the dynamic deterrence e¤ects of strict liability and negligence
in the case of discrete care. I argue that, notwithstanding their static ine¤ectiveness,
the injurers behavior under both rules moves in the direction of socially optimal
care over time through a learning-by-experimentation process. I then argue that
negligence, due to its information-generating property (see, e.g., Schäfer and Müller-
Langer 2009, § 1.6),3 accelerates the injurers learning process relative to strict liabil-
ity, giving negligence a dynamic advantage over strict liability in the case of discrete
care. I conclude that negligence is more robust than strict liability to computational
complexity and the reality of limited computational capacity (bounded rationality).
This paper contributes to two strands of the law and economics literature. The
rst is the strand that focuses on the question of whether strict liability or negligence
is superior in terms of tort deterrence. The pioneers of this strand include Calabresi
(1961, 1970), Posner (1972a,b), Brown (1973), Diamond (1974a,b), Green (1976),
Landes and Posner (1980, 1987) and Shavell (1980, 1987). Surveys of this strand are
provided by Shavell (2007), Schäfer and Müller-Langer (2009), and Arlen (2017).
The second is the behavioral strand that explores the implications of bounded
rationality for the standard economic analysis of tort deterrence. Jolls, Sunstein,
and Thaler (1998) and Korobkin and Ulen (2000) were among the early calls for the
modication of standard law and economics models to reect bounded rationality.
Zamir and Teichman (2018) provide a textbook treatment of the emergent eld of
behavioral law and economics, which includes a chapter on the behavioral analysis of
tort law. Faure (2010), Halbersberg and Guttel (2014), and Luppi and Parisi (2018)
provide surveys of behavioral models of tort law.
To my knowledge, this is the rst paper in the law and economics literature to
explore how computational complexity impacts tort deterrence. Legal economists
have long recognized that "peoples decision-making capabilities are relevant to the
design of tort law" (Zamir and Teichman 2018, p. 330). In their early paper on strict
liability, for instance, Guido Calabresi and Jon Hirscho¤ argue that the choice among
tort liability rules should depend not on the theoretical ability of injurers and victims
3See also Ott and Schäfer (1997), Feess and Wohlschlegel (2006), and Chakravarty, Kelsey, and
Teitelbaum (2019).
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to optimize, but rather on their actual abilities taking into account the "psychological
or other impediments" to optimizing (Calabresi and Hirscho¤ 1972, p. 1059; see also
Faure 2008).4 Subsequently, legal economists have studied the implications for tort
law of various aspects of bounded rationality, including ambiguity (Teitelbaum 2007;
Chakravarty and Kelsey 2017; Franzoni 2017) and unawareness (Chakravarty, Kelsey,
and Teitelbaum 2019). As far as I am aware, however, no other paper in the literature
has studied the implications of computational complexity for tort law.
This paper also contributes to the literature on legal complexity (see, e.g., Ehrlich
and Posner 1974; Schuck 1992; Kaplow 1995; Ruhl and Katz 2015). Papers in this
literature study various kinds of legal complexity, including the intricacy of legal
rules and the legal system. To my knowledge, the only other paper in this literature
that studies computational complexity is Kades (1997). In contrast to this paper,
Kades does not focus on the tractability of compliance problems arising under tort
law. Rather, he focuses on the tractability of adjudication problems in selected cases
arising under bankruptcy law, commercial law, contract law, corporate law, criminal
law, property law, and tax law. He also invokes computational complexity to explain
judgesaversion to multiparty disputes and the existence of private property.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a primer on
computational complexity theory. Sections 3 and 4 present the static and dynamic
analysis of tort deterrence, respectively. Section 5 o¤ers concluding remarks.
2 Computational Complexity
Computational complexity theory is a subeld of computer science that studies the
tractability of computational problems, including decision problems (i.e., yes-no prob-
lems) and optimization problems. In this section, I semi-rigorously dene several con-
cepts from computational complexity theory that are relevant for the tort deterrence
4Legal economists have also long recognized that peoples limited computational capacity is rel-
evant to contracts. In his oft-cited paper on the transaction cost approach to the study of economic
organization, for example, Oliver Williamson argues that "incomplete contracting is the best that
can be achieved" because "organizational man," unlike "economic man," is "boundedly rational" and
subject to "limits in formulating and solving complex problems" (Williamson 1981, pp. 553-554).
5There are a number of papers in the economics and computer science literatures that study
the computational complexity of economic models, including, for instance, papers that study the
tractability of computing Nash equilibria in games (Daskalakis 2009; Roughgarden 2010) and of
the consumers utility maximization problem (Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler 2010, 2015;
Echenique, Golovin, and Wierman 2011).
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Table 1: Polynomial Time versus Exponential Time
Running time
Input size Polynomial-time algorithm Exponential-time algorithm
(n) (n2 steps) (2n steps)
50 Less than a second Less than a second
75 Less than a second Less than a year
80 Less than a second More than a decade
85 Less than a second More than three centuries
90 Less than a second More than 10,000 years
95 Less than a second More than 350,000 years
100 Less than a second More than 12 million years
Note: Assumes one calculation per step and 200,000 trillion calculations per second.
analysis in Sections 3 and 4. For a more rigorous introduction to these concepts, see,
e.g., Garey and Johnson (1979), Schrijver (2003), or Kleinberg and Tardos (2006).
2.1 Algorithms and E¢ ciency
An algorithm is a step-by-step procedure for solving a computational problem. The
time complexity function of an algorithm, denoted by (n), gives the maximum num-
ber of elementary steps that the algorithm requires to produce its output, expressed
as a function of the size of its input, denoted by n. Algorithms are classied according
to the rate at which (n) grows with n. Algorithms for which (n) grows with n at
a polynomial rate (or slower) are said to run in polynomial time. Polynomial-time
algorithms are considered to be fast or e¢ cient. Algorithms for which (n) grows
with n at a faster rate (e.g., exponential) are considered to be ine¢ cient.
The e¢ ciency of polynomial-time algorithms is manifested by a comparison with
exponential-time algorithms. Table 1 displays the running times for selected in-
put sizes n  100 of a polynomial-time algorithm that requires n2 steps and an
exponential-time algorithm that requires 2n steps, assuming one calculation per step
and 200,000 trillion calculations per second (the peak speed of the worlds fastest
supercomputer). The polynomial-time algorithm runs in less than a second for all
input sizes n  100 (and, indeed, for all n  447; 213; 595). By contrast, the running
time of the exponential-time algorithm increases from less than a second for n = 50
to more than 12 million years for n = 100.
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2.2 Problems and Tractability
In light of the e¢ ciency of polynomial-time algorithms, problems that can be solved
in polynomial time are considered to be easy or computationally tractable. In what
follows, I describe the concept of NP-hardess, which is the dening property of
problems that are considered to be computationally intractable.
I begin with two classes of decision problems known as P and NP. P is the class
of decision problems that can be solved in polynomial time (i.e., e¢ ciently solved).
NP is the class of decision problems for which it can be veried in polynomial time
whether a proposed solution is correct (i.e., e¢ ciently veried). Every problem in P
is necessarily also in NP (i.e., P  NP), for if a problem can be e¢ ciently solved
that e¢ ciently veries whether a proposed solution correct. Whether P = NP (i.e.,
whether every decision problem that can be e¢ ciently veried can also be e¢ ciently
solved) is an open question indeed, it is a Millennium Prize Problem (Ja¤e 2000).
It is conjectured and presumed that P 6= NP.
A decision problem is NP-complete if it is in NP and every other problem in NP
is reducible to it. One problem is reducible to a second problem if the existence of
an e¢ cient solution to the second problem would imply the existence of an e¢ cient
solution to the rst problem. In this sense, an NP-complete problem is at least as
hard as every other problem in NP. It follows that an NP-complete problem can
be e¢ ciently solved if and only if P = NP. However, because an NP-complete
problem is in NP, it can be e¢ ciently veried whether a proposed solution to an
NP-complete problem is correct, whether or not P = NP.
I now come to the concept of NP-hardness. A computational problem (not nec-
essarily a decision problem) is NP-hard if every problem in NP is reducible to it.
By denition, every NP-complete problem is NP-hard, but not every NP-hard
problem is NP-complete.6 Moreover, because every problem in NP is reducible to
an NP-hard problem, an NP-hard problem is at least as hard as every problem in
NP, including all NP-complete problems, which are the hardest problems in NP. It
follows that an NP-hard problem can be e¢ ciently solved only if P = NP, or, equiv-
alently, that no NP-hard problem can be e¢ ciently solved unless P = NP.7 Because
6Indeed, another way to dene an NP-complete problem is an NP-hard problem that is in NP.
7Even if P = NP, this would imply only that some, but not necessarily all, NP-hard problems
can be e¢ ciently solved.
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Figure 1: Relationship between P, NP, NP-complete, and NP-hard.
it is conjectured and presumed that P 6= NP, all NP-hard problems, including all
NP-complete problems, are considered to be computationally intractable.
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the classes P, NP, NP-complete, and
NP-hard under the consensus presumption that P 6= NP.
2.3 Optimization Problems and Decision Problems
In Sections 3 and 4, I analyze the tractability of two types of computational problems:
optimization problems and decision problems. An optimization problem has the fol-
lowing form: Given a set of feasible alternatives and an objective function dened
on the feasible set, nd a subset of the feasible set that minimizes (or maximizes)
the value of the objective function. Every optimization problem has a corresponding
decision problem of the following form: Given a set of feasible alternatives, an objec-
tive function dened on the feasible set, and a given value of the objective function,
determine whether there is a subset of the feasible set such that the value of the
objective function is not greater than (or not less than) the given value.
The following are two well-known examples of optimization problems.
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Problem 1 (Traveling Salesman) Let C = f1; : : : ; ng be a nite set of cities and
let d(i; j) 2 Z+ denote the distance between two cities i; j 2 C.8 In addition, let
Sn denote the set of all permutations of the elements of C, representing the set of
feasible routes that visit each city once. Find a route  = ((1); : : : ; (n)) 2 Sn
that minimizes the the total distance of the round trip dened by the route, given by
f() =
Pn 1
i=1 d((i); (i+ 1)

+ d((n); (1)).
Problem 2 (Maximum Directed Cut) Let G = (V ; E) be a directed graph, where
V is the set of vertices and E is the set of directed edges (i.e., ordered pairs of vertices),
and let c(e) 2 Z+ denote the capacity of an edge e 2 E.9 For every subset of vertices
A  V, let (A) = fe = (u; v) 2 Eju 2 A; v 2 VnAg denote the set of edges that cross
the cut fA;VnAg. Find a subset A  V that maximizes the total capacity of the edges
that cross the cut fA;VnAg, given by f(A) =Pe2(A) c(e).
The decision problems that correspond to these optimization problems are:
1. Given b 2 Z++, is there a route  2 Sn such that f()  b?
2. Given b 2 Z++, is there a subset A  V such that f(A)  b?
These decision problems are both known to be NP-complete (see, e.g., Garey and
Johnson 1979).10 This implies that the corresponding optimization problems areNP-
hard. Indeed, any optimization problem is NP-hard if the corresponding decision
problem is NP-complete. This follows from the fact that the corresponding decision
problem is reducible to the optimization problem. More generally, two common ways
of establishing that an optimization problem is NP-hard are: (i) show that the
corresponding decision problem is NP-complete or (ii) show that the optimization
problem generalizes a known NP-hard optimization problem (which implies that the
latter is reducible to the former).
2.4 Approximation Algorithms
If an optimization problem is NP-hard, implying that it cannot be e¢ ciently solved
(assuming P 6= NP), there nevertheless may exist an e¢ cient algorithm that ap-
proximates the problem within some constant factor. Such an algorithm is called an
8It is assumed that d(i; j) can be evaluated in polynomial time for all i; j 2 C.
9It is assumed that c(e) can be evaluated in polynomial time for all e 2 E .
10In fact, the Minimum Cut decision problem, the undirected version of Minimum Directed Cut
decision problem, was one of the 21 problems that Karp (1972) famously proved are NP-complete.
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-approximation algorithm, where  denotes the factor within which the algorithm
is guaranteed to approximate the optimal value of the problem. For example, the
Traveling Salesman optimization problem, in the instance where d satises the tri-
angle inequality, is known to have a 3
2
-approximation algorithm (Christodes 1976);
that is, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that outputs a route e such that
f()  f(e)  3
2
f(), where  denotes an optimal route (i.e., a route that mini-
mizes the total distance of the round trip).11
More generally, if x is a solution to an optimization problem with objective func-
tion f , an -approximation algorithm for the problem is a polynomial-time algorithm
whose output ex satises (i) f(x)  f(ex)  f(x) for some   1, in the case of a
minimization problem, or (ii) f(x)  f(ex)  f(x) for some 0    1, in the case
of a maximization problem. If there exists an -approximation algorithm for an op-
timization problem, we say that the problem can be e¢ ciently approximated within
a factor of . If, in addition, the factor  is "reasonable" (a subjective judgment
that depends on the specic instance of the problem), we say that the problem is
reasonably approximable. If, however, an optimization problem cannot be e¢ ciently
approximated within a factor of  (assuming P 6= NP), we say that it is NP-hard
to approximate the problem within a factor of .
3 Tort Deterrence
I analyze tort deterrence using the unilateral care model with xed activity level. As
noted above, the unilateral care model with xed activity level is the foundational
model upon which other economic models of tort deterrence are built. Although the
analysis could be extended to richer models that contemplate, for example, bilateral
care or variable activity level, it would not change the main takeaways of the analysis.
There are two agents: an injurer and a victim. Both are risk neutral expected
utility maximizers. The agents are strangers and not in any contractual relationship.
Transaction costs are su¢ ciently high to preclude Coasian bargaining.
The injurer engages in a risky activity. In the event of an accident, the victim in-
curs a loss. The injurer, but not the victim, can take precautions against an accident.
The injurers set of feasible precautions is the precaution set.
11The distance d satises that triangle inequality if d(i; k)  d(i; j) + d(j; k) for all i; j; k 2 C:
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The governing liability rule determines whether the injurer is liable to the victim
for her loss in the event of an accident. I consider the two basic liability rules of
tort law: negligence and strict liability. Under negligence, the injurer is liable to the
victim if the injurer failed to exercise due care (a legal standard set by the court)
when engaging in his activity. Under strict liability, the injurer is liable to the victim
whether or not the injurer exercised due care when engaging in his activity.
A liability rule is optimal if the solution to the injurers problem under that rule
is socially optimal. A liability rule is e¤ective if the injurers problem under that rule
is computationally tractable or reasonably approximable. After all, if the injurers
problem cannot be e¢ ciently solved or approximated within a reasonable factor, the
rule cannot e¤ectively regulate the injurers behavior. Only a liability rule that is
both optimal and e¤ective can achieve socially optimal deterrence.
3.1 Convex Care
The standard "convex care" version of the model makes the following assumptions
(cf. Shavell 1987).
(C1) The precaution set is convex usually R+, interpreted as the set of feasible
levels of spending on safety.12
(C2) The injurer chooses a level of care x 2 R+ having cost c(x)  0, where the cost
of care function c : R+ ! R+ is monotone increasing and convex.
 Monotone increasing: c(x)  c(y) for all x  y in R+.
 Convex: c(x+z) x(x)  c(y+z) c(y) for all x  y in R+ and z 2 R+.13
In other words, the injurers cost of care increases with additional care at an
increasing rate, reecting increasing marginal cost of care.
(C3) The victims expected loss (i.e., the probability of an accident multiplied by the
amount of the victims loss in the event of an accident) is `(x)  0, where the
expected loss function ` : R+ ! R+ is monotone decreasing and convex.
12A set X  Rn is convex if every convex combination of every pair of elements of X lies in X,
i.e., if x+ (1  )y 2 X for all x; y 2 X and  2 [0; 1] (see, e.g., Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004).
13This denition, which characterizes convexity in terms of increasing di¤erences, follows from the
standard denition that a function c : R+ ! R+ is convex if c(x+ (1  )y)  c(x) + (1  )c(y)
for all x; y 2 R+ and  2 [0; 1]. See, e.g., Simchi-Levi, Bramel, and Chen (2005, prop. 2.2.6).
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 Monotone decreasing: `(x)  `(y) for all x  y in R+.
 Convex: `(x+ z)  `(x)  `(y + z)  `(y) for all x  y in R+ and z 2 R+.
In other words, the victims expected loss decreases with additional care at a
decreasing rate, reecting decreasing marginal benet of care (i.e., diminishing
marginal returns to care).
(C4) Both c and ` can be evaluated in polynomial time at all x 2 R+. This is an
unstated assumption in prior expositions of the standard model.
In addition, the cost of care and expected loss functions are usually assumed to be
twice di¤erentiable. If c and ` are twice di¤erentiable, then assumption (C2) implies
that c0(x)  0 and c00(x)  0 at all x 2 R+, and assumption (C3) implies that
`0(x)  0 and `00(x)  0 at all x 2 R+.
3.1.1 The Social Problem
The social problem is to nd a level of care x 2 R+ that minimizes the total cost of
the injurers activity (the injurers cost of care plus the victims expected loss):
minimize
x2R+
c(x) + `(x):
I assume that the social problem has a unique interior solution. By denition, the
level of care x 2 R+ that solves the social problem is socially optimal.
Given assumptions (C1)(C4), the social problem is a standard convex optimiza-
tion problem it entails the minimization of a convex function over a convex set.14 It
follows that the social problem is computationally tractable, for it can be e¢ ciently
solved using known polynomial-time algorithms for convex optimization problems.
For instance, it can be e¢ ciently solved using subgradient methods if the total cost
function, s(x)  c(x)+`(x), is non-di¤erentiable (see, e.g., Bertsekas 2016) or interior-
point methods if the total cost function is di¤erentiable (see, e.g., Boyd and Vanden-
berghe 2004). In the non-di¤erentiable case, x satises the condition 0 2 @s(x),
where @s(x) is the subdi¤erential of s at x.15 In the di¤erentiable case, x satises
14Observe that c(x) + `(x) is convex because the sum of two convex functions is convex.
15Intuitively, the subdi¤erential of s at x is the set of "derivatives" of s at x (i.e., the set of slopes
of the lines that intersect s only at x). If s is di¤erentiable at x then @s(x) = s0(x). Otherwise @s(x)
is an interval. For example, suppose s(x) = jxj. Note that s is di¤erentiable at all x 2 R except
x = 0. Then @s(x) =  1 for all x < 0, @s(x) = 1 for all x > 0, and @s(x) = [ 1; 1] at x = 0.
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the condition 0 = s0(x). In both cases, x is the level of care at which the marginal
cost of care equals the marginal benet of care (i.e., the marginal reduction in ex-
pected loss). This can be readily seen in the di¤erentiable case, where the condition
0 = s0(x) is equivalent to the condition c0(x) =  `0(x).
3.1.2 The Injurers Problem
Under strict liability, the injurers problem is
minimize
x2R+
c(x) + `(x):
This problem is identical to the social problem, because strict liability forces the
injurer to internalize the total cost of his activity. Under strict liability, therefore,
the solution to injurers problem is socially optimal and the injurers problem is
computationally tractable. Hence, strict liability is both optimal and e¤ective.
Under negligence, the injurer e¤ectively faces strict liability if he chooses a level
of care x < x, where x 2 R+ is the due care standard set by the court, and he faces
no liability if he chooses x  x. Accordingly, the injurers problem under negligence
has two stages. The rst is
1: minimize
x2[0;x]
c(x) + `(x):
Let bx 2 R+ denote the solution, which I assume is unique. The second stage is
2: choose
(
x = bx if c(bx) + `(bx) < c(x)
x = x if c(bx) + `(bx)  c(x) :
That is, the injurer chooses x = bx if it is better (i.e., cheaper in expectation) to takebx and face potential liability for an accident than to take due care and avoid potential
liability; otherwise he chooses to take due care, x = x.
If the court sets the due care standard equal to the socially optimal level of care,
x = x, then negligence is also optimal and e¤ective. Negligence with x = x is
optimal because x is the solution to the injurers problem under this rule. To see this,
observe that if x = x then bx = x and thus c(bx)+`(bx) = c(x)+`(x) < c(x) = c(x),
12
which implies that the injurer chooses x = x.16 Negligence with x = x (or, for that
matter, any x 2 R+) is e¤ective because both stages of the injurers problem are
computationally tractable: the rst stage is a standard convex optimization problem,
which can be e¢ ciently solved, and the second stage amounts to verifying whether bx
is a solution to the decision problem, "Given c(x) 2 R+, is there a level of care x  R+
such that c(x)+ `(x) < c(x)?," which can be e¢ ciently veried per assumption (C4).
Because strict liability and negligence with x = x are both optimal and e¤ective,
both liability rules can achieve socially optimal deterrence. The following theorem
recaps the preceding results.
Theorem 1 In the case of convex care, strict liability and negligence with x = x
are both optimal and e¤ective. Hence, both strict liability and negligence can achieve
socially optimal deterrence.
3.2 Discrete Care
In the standard model, the assumption that the precaution set is convex is instru-
mental to ensuring that the injurers problem is computationally tractable. In reality,
however, the precaution set is often discrete. In what follows, I re-examine tort de-
terrence using a "discrete care" version of the unilateral accident model with xed
activity level.
The discrete care version of the model makes the following assumptions.
(D1) The precaution set is discrete denoted N , interpreted as the set of feasible
safety measures. I assume that N is nite but "large," to rule out trivial cases
and to make the discrete case as comparable as possible to the convex case
(where the precaution set is uncountably innite).
(D2) The injurer chooses a subset of care X  N having cost c(X)  0, where the
cost of care function c : 2N ! R+ is monotone increasing and supermodular.17
 Monotone increasing: c(X)  c(Y ) for all X  Y  N .
16Negligence with x < x is never optimal (because the solution to the injurers problem under
this rule is x = x < x). Negligence with x > x may be optimal for some c and `, but only
negligence with x = x is optimal for all c and `.
17Note that 2N denotes the set of all subsets of N .
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 Supermodular: c(X [fig)  c(X)  c(Y [fig)  c(Y ) for all X  Y  N
and i 2 NnY .18
In other words, the injurers cost of care increases with additional care at
an increasing rate, reecting increasing marginal cost of care. In this sense,
a monotone increasing supermodular set function is the discrete analog of a
monotone increasing convex function.
(D3) The victims expected loss is `(X)  0, where the expected loss function ` :
2N ! R+ is monotone decreasing and supermodular.
 Monotone decreasing: `(X)  `(Y ) for all X  Y  N .
 Supermodular: `(X [ fig)  `(X)  `(Y [ fig)  `(Y ) for all X  Y  N
and i 2 NnY .
In other words, the victims expected loss decreases with additional care at a
decreasing rate, reecting decreasing marginal benet of care (i.e., diminishing
marginal returns to care). In this sense, a monotone decreasing supermodular
set function is the discrete analog of a monotone decreasing convex function.
(D4) Both c and ` can be evaluated in polynomial time at all X  N .
3.2.1 The Injurers Problem
As before, the injurers problem under strict liability coincides with the social problem
minimize the total cost of the injurers activity:
minimize
XN
c(X) + `(X):
Like before, I assume this problem has a unique interior solution. Because the subset
of care X  N that solves this problem is socially optimal, strict liability is optimal.
The injurers problem under negligence is
1: minimize
XX
c(X) + `(X);
2: choose
(
X = bX if c( bX) + `( bX) < c(X)
X = X if c( bX) + `( bX)  c(X) ;
18See, e.g., Bach (2013).
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where X  N is the due care standard set by the court and bX  N is the unique
solution to the rst-stage minimization problem. If the court sets X = X, then X is
the solution to the injurers problem under negligence. The logic here is analogous to
the logic in the case of convex care. Hence, negligence with X = X is also optimal.19
In general, however, neither strict liability nor negligence is e¤ective in the case of
discrete care. I reach this conclusion on the basis of the following two propositions.
Proposition 1 In the case of discrete care, it is NP-hard to approximate the in-
jurers problem, whether under strict liability or negligence, within any constant factor.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from Maximum Directed Cut. Let f : 2V !
R+ denote the cut capacity function in the Maximum Directed Cut optimization
problem dened in Section 2. It is known that f is submodular, non-negative, and
not necessarily monotone or symmetric (see, e.g., Feige, Mirronki, and Vondrák 2011).
In addition, let C =
P
e2E c(e) denote the total capacity of all edges in the graph.
For every subset of vertices A  V, let g(A) = C   f(A) + , where  > 0.
Observe that g : 2V ! R+ is a supermodular set function.20 Note further that g is
non-negative and not necessarily monotone or symmetric.
It is known that it is NP-hard to approximate the Maximum Directed Cut op-
timization problem within a factor greater than 12
13
(Håstad 2001, thm. 8.3). This
implies that it isNP-hard to distinguish between the following two mutually exclusive
instances of the Maximum Directed Cut decision problem:
1. There exists a susbset A  V such that f(A) = C.
2. There does not exist a subset A  V such that f(A) > 12
13
C.
Note that in the rst instance the minimum value of g is , while in the second
instance the minimum value of g exceeds 1
13
C.
Suppose there exists an -approximation algorithm for the injurers problem the
minimization of a real-valued supermodular set function over a discrete set where the
objective function is non-negative and not necessarily monotone or symmetric. Then
we could apply this algorithm to the problem maxAV g(A). In the rst instance, the
19As before, negligence with X  X is never optimal, negligence with X  X may be optimal
for some c and `, but only negligence with X = X is optimal for all c and `.
20If f is a submodular set function then  f is supermodular. Moreover, the sum of a supermodular
set function and a constant is supermodular. Note that C +  is a constant.
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algorithm would return a subset bA such that g( bA)  . In the second instance, it
would return a subset bA such that g( bA) > 1
13
C. Because  is arbitrary, it can be
chosen so that  < 1
13
C. This would make it possible to distinguish between the two
instances of Maximum Directed Cut, because in the rst instance the algorithm would
yield g( bA)   < 1
13
C, while in the second instance it would yield  < 1
13
C < g( bA).
This, however, contradicts the fact that it is NP-hard to distinguish between the
two instances. It follows, therefore, that there does not exist an -approximation
algorithm for the injurers problem, which is equivalent to the statement that it is
NP-hard to approximate the injurers problem within any constant factor.
Remark. Mittal and Schulz (2013, thm. 8) prove a similar result for the minimization
of an integer-valued supermodular set function. Their proof is by reduction from the
E4-Set Splitting optimization problem.21 The proof of Proposition 1, which is by
reduction from the Maximum Directed Cut optimization problem, generalizes their
result to a real-valued supermodular set function.
Proposition 2 In the case of discrete care, the injurers problem, whether under
strict liability or negligence, is NP-hard.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Proposition 1. If it is NP-hard to
approximate the injurers problem within any constant factor, then it is NP-hard
to approximate the injurers problem within a factor of 1, which is equivalent to the
statement that the injurers problem is NP-hard.
Remark. The foregoing results on the hardness of supermodular minimization stand
in contrast to the fact that submodular minimization is easy (Grötschel, Lovász, and
Schrijver 1981). The basic reason is that the convex closure of a submodular set
function has a closed form that is easy to compute, while this generally is not the case
for supermodular set functions (see, e.g., Bach 2013).22 Conequently, one can easily
solve a submodular minimization problem by leveraging the fact that the minimum of
a set function is equivalent to the minimum of its convex closure, while this generally
is not the case for a supermodular minimization problem.
21For a statement of the E4-Set Splitting optimization problem, see, e.g., Håstad (2001, def. 2.9).
22The convex closure of a real-valued set function f on N is the greatest real-valued convex
function on RjN j that everywhere lowerbounds f . The convex closure of a real-valued submodular
set function is known as the Lovasz extension (Lovász 1983).
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Propositions 1 and 2 establish that the injurers problem, whether under strict
liability or negligence, is neither computationally tractable nor reasonably approx-
imable. Hence, neither strict liability nor negligence is e¤ective in the case of discrete
care. The following theorem recaps the preceding results.
Theorem 2 In the case of discrete care, although both strict liability and negligence
with X = Xare optimal, neither liability rule is e¤ective. Hence, neither strict
liability nor negligence can achieve socially optimal deterrence.
4 Dynamics of Tort Deterrence
The main takeaway of the previous section that neither strict liability nor negligence
can achieve socially optimal deterrence in the case of discrete care is based on a
static analysis. In this section, I consider the dynamics of tort deterrence in the
case of discrete care. I argue that (i) the injurers behavior, under either liability
rule, moves in the direction of socially optimal care over time through a learning-by-
experimentation process, but that (ii) negligence has a dynamic advantage over strict
liability in that negligence accelerates the injurers learning process.
The starting point is the observation that the decision problems corresponding to
the injurers problem under strict liability and negligence are in NP.
Proposition 3 In the case of discrete care, the decision problem that corresponds to
the injurers problem, whether under strict liability or negligence, is in NP.
Proof. The decision problem that corresponds to the injurers problem under strict
liability is: Given b 2 R+, is there a subset of care X  N such that c(X)+`(X)  b?
The decision problem that corresponds to the injurers problem under negligence is:
Given c(X) 2 R+, is there a subset of care X  X such that c(X) + `(X)  c(X)?
Take either decision problem and suppose we are given a proposed solution Y 
N . Per assumption (D4), it can be e¢ ciently veried whether c(Y ) + `(Y )  b or
c(Y ) + `(Y )  c(X), as the case may be. Hence, each decision problem is in NP.
Now, consider how the injurers behavior evolves over time as he repeatedly en-
gages in his risky activity, periodically causing an accident. Let t = 0 denote the time
before the injurer rst engages in his activity, let t = 1 denote the time after the rst
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accident but before the injurer next engages in his activity, let t = 2 denote the time
after the second accident but before the injurer next engages in his activity, and so
forth. In addition, assume that: (i) each time there is an accident, the circumstances
of the accident suggest a subset of care Yt  N that would have prevented the ac-
cident; (ii) each time there is an accident, the victim brings suit against the injurer
before the court; and (iii) the injurer, the victim, and the court all have access to the
same computational methods.
Suppose rst that the governing liability rule is strict liability. At t = 0, the injurer
chooses a subset of care X0  N . However, because the injurers problem is neither
computationally tractable nor reasonably approximable, it is likely that X0 6= X.
At t = 1, the injurer can e¢ ciently verify whether c(Y1)+ `(Y1)  c(X0)+ `(X0), i.e.,
whether Y1 is superior to X0. This follows from Proposition 3. If Y1 is superior to
X0, the injurer adopts X1 = Y1; otherwise he stands pat at X1 = X0. At t = 2, the
injurer can e¢ ciently verify whether Y2 is superior to X1. If it is, the injurer adopts
X2 = Y2; otherwise he stands pat at X2 = X1. And so forth. In this way, as t!1,
the injurers behavior moves in the direction of socially optimal care X.
Suppose next that the governing liability rule is negligence, with due care standard
X0 at t = 0. Note that because the social problem is neither computationally tractable
nor reasonably approximable, it is likely that X0 6= X. Note further that because
the injurer and the court have access to the same computational methods, the injurer
always chooses to take due care: Xt = X t at all t. Thus, we need only consider the
evolution of the due care standard. At t = 1, the court can e¢ ciently verify whether
Y1 is superior to X0. This follows from Proposition 3 and the fact that the social
problem is identical to the injurers problem under strict liability. If Y1 is superior
to X0, the court adopts X1 = Y1; otherwise it stands pat at X1 = X0. At t = 2,
the court can e¢ ciently verify whether Y2 is superior to X1. If it is, the court adopts
X2 = Y2; otherwise it stands pat at X2 = X1. And so forth. In this way, as t!1,
the injurers behavior moves in the direction of socially optimal care X.
So far the analysis suggests that the evolution of the injurers behavior over time is
the same under strict liability and negligence. Each time there is an accident, nature
proposes a solution Yt and the injurer can e¢ ciently verify whether Yt is superior to
the status quo and adapt his behavior accordingly. It is a learning-by-experimentation
process, akin to the process of learning the probability distribution of an unfair coin
through repeated ips.
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The dynamic advantage of negligence emerges when we add other injurers to the
story who engage in the same risky activity but whose accidents are unobserved by
our injurer. We can illustrate the point by adding just one other such injurer. Suppose
that the other injurers accidents occur at periods t = 1
2
, t = 3
2
, and so forth, but
that the two injurers are otherwise identical (same precaution set, same cost of care
function, etc.). Return rst to the case where strict liability is the governing liability
rule. Because our injurer does not observe the other injurers accidents, he does not
observe the sequence Y 1
2
; Y 3
2
; :::: He therefore cannot learn from the other injurers
accidents, implying that his learning process is the same as before, with adaptations
in his behavior possible only at periods t = 1; 2; ::::
Now return to the case where negligence is the governing liability rule. Although
our injurer does not observe the sequence Y 1
2
; Y 3
2
; :::, the court does. Consequently,
the courts learning process is faster than before, with adaptations in the due care
standard possible at periods t = 1
2
; 1; 3
2
; 2; :::: This accelerates our injurers learning
process, for he observes the sequence X 1
2
; X1; X 3
2
; X2; :::, making adaptations in his
behavior more frequent.23 In this way, negligence can move the injurers behavior in
the direction of socially optimal care more rapidly than strict liability.
5 Conclusion
Standard economic models of tort deterrence assume that an injurers precaution set
is convex. In reality, however, the precaution set is often discrete. I show that in
cases with discrete care, the injurers care-taking problem under strict liability and
negligence is computationally intractable, frustrating their static deterrence e¤ects.
I then argue that while both liability rules can be e¤ective in terms of dynamic
deterrence, negligence has a dynamic advantage over strict liability in that negligence,
due to its information-generating property, can move the injurers behavior in the
direction of socially optimal care over time more rapidly than strict liability.
My analysis leads me to two main conclusions. The rst is that the standard
assumption of convex care, though seemingly innocuous, is pivotal to constituting the
injurer as Holmesunboundedly rational "bad man" homo law-and-economicus.24
Insofar as discrete care is more realistic, the injurer may be more like H.L.A. Harts
23Indeed, the more injurers we add to the story, the greater is the rate of this acceleration.
24The term homo law-and-economicus was coined by Gordon (1997, p. 1014).
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"puzzled man : : : who is willing to do what is required, if only he can be told what
it is" (Hart 1961, p. 40). The second conclusion is that negligence is more robust
than strict liability to the reality of bounded rationality and limited computational
capacity. While this does not imply that negligence is superior to strict liability in all
circumstances, it may help to explain why negligence is the general basis for accident
liability under modern Anglo-American tort law.
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